| abstract | The irruption of legal persons as criminally liable subjects requires rethinking their position incriminal proceedings. It is necessary to reflect on what their procedural legal status should be in order
 to guarantee their right of defence and their right to the due process of law, but without disregarding
 their special nature, clearly different from that of human beings. The recognition of the right against
 self-incrimination to legal persons is especially controversial. On the one hand, this right has a
 personal nature; it is highly connected with human dignity and aimed at preventing torture. These
 features provide arguments for denying it to legal persons. However, on the other hand, the connection
 of the right against self-incrimination with the right of defence and the presumption of innocence,
 which are structural principles of criminal proceedings, advocate for its recognition to legal persons
 as criminal defendants. In the search for a balanced solution between the inclusion and the exclusion
 of legal persons from the scope of protection of this fundamental right, it seems appropriate to establish
 certain limits to its exercise, taking into account the special nature of corporations but also
 considering its need of protection within criminal proceedings.
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