Between March 1793 and July 1794, when the French armies were undergoing a difficult period in a European war triggered in 1792, no fewer than forty-three generals were brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal and sentenced to execution. Among them, twenty-seven were found guilty for exclusively military reasons. They were not sanctioned for open treason but for decisions taken by military commanders in managing the army. The revolutionaries reckoned that mistakes by military command were not a matter of professional jurisdiction. Therefore, it was the Revolutionary Tribunal which was tasked with appraising the generals’ conduct: in this case military justice was delivered by exceptional civil justice.
The method of referral to the court, proceedings, prosecution strategy, and verdicts provided the revolutionary authorities with an opportunity to define a doctrine of war. This set out the nature of military command, distinguishing between tactics and strategy (which fell outside the competence of a general), and operations (for which a general was responsible). It also defined victory in radical terms. Through its decisions, the Tribunal accredited the myths of military planning and of the decisive battle.