In this research, use was made of both quantitative and qualitative methods, although the core of the research was built around the qualitative phase. The quantitative phase consisted of a standardised questionnaire that was sent to all Belgian compliance officers2 in the spring of 2007. This questionnaire (n=74) led to a first insight in the profile and practice of compliance officers, the dilemmas they are confronted with and the functioning of the AML complex. Based on the results of this questionnaire, interviews were conducted with compliance officers, police services, the regulator
and the FIU (n= 32). Furthermore, a number of interviews with members of the compliance industry were conducted (n=6). During the finalisation of the research, three more interviews were conducted with compliance officers and a member of the compliance industry, both to check the results of this study and to provide some form of feedback to the respondents. The empirical results of this research have led to a confirmation of the research hypothesis, and an insight into the ‘world of compliance and AML’, how compliance is strived for, which kind of obligations banks are supposed to fulfil, how decisions are made during money laundering investigations, and what the extent of cooperation
between public and private actors in the AML complex is it also showed us the role of the compliance industry, trying to push banks further and further into more AML investments to cover as many risks as possible. Our research has therefore shown that there indeed are interactions (even mutually reinforcing interactions) between the AML complex (consisting of the public and private actors in AML) on the one hand and the compliance industry (providing services for AML on a commercial basis) on
the other hand. The simple presence of an array of services within the compliance industry promotes the use of these services (Verhage, 2009d). After all, banks are well aware of the AML and compliance ‘benchmark’ that exists. This benchmark represents both the level of compliance and AML investments by banks and the threshold within banks for money laundering attempts (the level of AML defence). “The benchmark is what happens in the market”, one of our respondents stated (Verhage, 2009a). Banks have stated that they aim to find the mid-position with regard to this benchmark: from
an entrepreneurial point of view, it is not interesting to be at the top of AML, nor to be at the bottom. By offering services and promoting AML as a concept in a competitive framework, the compliance industry pushes banks toward more investments in AML and hence raises this AML/compliance benchmark. This is also successful because of the regulator’s obligation to make use of the services of the compliance industry. After all, one of the obligations is to have a monitoring system put in place within the bank, allowing for a structural and continuous monitoring of suspicious transactions. As a result, banks are obliged to make use of these types of software, developed by entrepreneurs. This is a mutually reinforcing interaction between the AML complex on the one hand and the compliance industry on the other.